Russia’s Queenside Castling in the High North: A Strategic Risk or Opportunity for the West?

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UK F35B lightning on the deck of HMS Prince of Wales, participating in NATO’s 2024 Exercise Steadfast Defender, the largest NATO High North exercise in decades. Photo: UK Ministry of Defence

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 reshaped global geopolitics and strategic risk, affecting even the High North. Security concerns, including continued regional militarisation, prompted Finland and Sweden to join NATO. Simultaneously, cooperation with Moscow within the Arctic Council (AC) has almost completely dried up despite Norway’s efforts. There is good reason to be concerned about the Council’s future.

The concept of “One Arctic” has fractured into two geopolitically distinct and almost equally sized regions; one dominated by NATO, and another by Russia. With the West isolating Russia due to its invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has found itself compelled to find other partners to collaborate with regarding the development of its Arctic area. China was first in line.

This creates increased strategic risks for the West regarding regional and indeed global security as Moscow invites those it deems partners to the region, potentially bringing to fruition concerns raised by the UK’s current Chief of the Defence Staff in 2020 that an opening Arctic could facilitate Chinese maritime power projection into the Atlantic. It also, however, equally presents new opportunities for rekindling currently stalled dialogue over the region’s future, courtesy of “bridging actors” like India becoming increasingly involved.

A Growing China in the Russian Arctic

Beijing’s Arctic interest predates 2022, but Russia has long been cautious about foreign involvement in its Arctic area since declaring it strategically important for its national development in 2008. However, the war in Ukraine fundamentally changed the situation. Between January 2022 and June 2023 234 Chinese-owned firms registered in the Russian-controlled Arctic, an 87 percent increase from the preceding two years. Furthermore, after February 2022, China has started constructing its own docks in the five most significant ports along Russia’s Arctic coastline – Murmansk, Sabetta, Arkhangelsk, Tiksi, and Uzhden – along with establishing Chinese railway lines in the area. In 2023, there was a record increase in transit cargo via the Northern Sea Route, totalling 75 shipments, with over 95 percent destined for or originating from China. Experts have observed, “In response to Western sanctions, Russia has opened up the Arctic to China like never before”. This was irrefutably confirmed in September 2022 when a US Coast Guard ship unexpectedly encountered Chinese and Russian warships operating together in formation in the Bering Sea near Alaska.

Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the process of (re)militarising the Arctic initiated by Moscow more than a decade and a half ago did not include other actors, not even partner countries with which the Kremlin maintained close cooperation in the defence sector. While the Chinese-Russian naval operation complied with international laws and regulations, it signified “a notable shift in the regional security picture”. Two more similar events were observed during 2023.

Internationalisation Within a Divided Arctic – Russia Invites the BRICS

The “shift” gained momentum after Russia invited other nations to join the development of the High North. At the close of its AC chairmanship (2021-2023), Moscow publicised a document titled “Prospects for BRICS Cooperation on Sustainable Development in the Arctic“, inviting China, India, Brazil, and the Republic of South Africa to become more involved in the region. Pointedly, Russia identified all potential areas for further development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation – from science diplomacy to energy and transport.

India, an AC observer since 2013 appears to be particularly interested in deeper engagement. Following the declaration of its national Arctic policy in March 2022, India’s Ministry of Earth Sciences revealed that the National Council for Educational Research and Training had formed a committee to emphasise the significance of research in the Arctic in school textbooks, suggesting that New Delhi is preparing for long-term involvement in the region.

During its chairmanship of the AC, Russia also engaged in discussions regarding initiating cooperation in the High North with the member countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India, and Pakistan). According to Nikolay Korchunov, Russian Ambassador-at-large, these countries are very interested in working with Moscow in the Arctic, and their intentions are strategic in nature. In a statement dated May 2023, he claimed that several bilateral projects in areas such as scientific research, logistics, environmental protection, as well as maritime cooperation were being developed. In addition to SCO and BRICS countries, that same year, Turkey and Thailand also expressed their interest in joining Russian High North initiatives.

While overtures for partner countries to partake in the development of the Arctic region were well noted in the past, it appears that the momentum has finally matured, leading Moscow to embark upon the exploitation of its Arctic Zone independently of the members of the AC.

Increasing Strategic Risk

Russia’s opening of the Arctic is viewed unfavourably by many Western countries, especially the US. For example, Beijing officially claims its policy goal is to “participate in Arctic affairs in accordance with the basic principles of respect, cooperation, win-win results, and sustainability,” but it also has been keen to assert its own perceived Arctic rights, not least of all through its self-declaration as a “near-Arctic” state. This caused concern even before Russia invaded Ukraine. By 2019 Beijing’s overall performance in the High North has caused many traditionally cooperative issues in the Arctic, such as sea trade and research, to become perceived security issues in an age of strategic competition, removing hopes of the Arctic as a “low tension” region. This was unequivocally expressed in the US Army’s “Regaining Arctic Dominance,” which clearly states that, “The Arctic has the potential to become a contested space where US’ great power rivals, Russia and China, seek to use military and economic power to gain and maintain access to the region at the expense of US interests.” It emphasises the US Army must “organise to win in the Arctic”, and that the region represents “an arena of competition, a line of attack in conflict…and a platform for global power projection.” The 2024 Department of Defense Arctic Strategy reiterated a similar stance, while simultaneously, China’s military texts and diplomats have frequently alluded to the Arctic as a future zone of military competition and the new “commanding heights”.

Moscow’s invitation for other countries to participate in Arctic development then further complicates the geopolitical landscape of the High North, prompting the US and its NATO allies to respond to Russia’s strategic shift and arguably changing Arctic geopolitics forever. Russia’s internationalisation of a divided Arctic diminishes the AC’s relevance while increasing the influence of non-Arctic powers like China, with Arctic states collectively unable to significantly cooperate on regional affairs “as a region”.

New Opportunities for Bridging a Divided Arctic

Despite the challenges the new matrix could bring, opportunities arise with actors like India and Turkey. Turkey, though recently expressing an intention to join BRICS, has been a NATO member for decades, while India balances close ties with Russia and partnerships with the US, forging its own path. Both countries have proven effective as “geopolitical catalysts” and are keen to engage in efforts to end the war in Ukraine. They could be significant “bridging” players in Arctic politics.

While China’s growing presence in the Arctic and its partnership with Russia are seen as threats to US and NATO interests, the involvement of actors like Turkey and India could be advantageous to defusing regional tensions. Of course, such a strategy will surely be influenced by developments in other regions of the world—primarily Eastern Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and the Middle East—where many diverse and often conflicting interests intersect. Combining the West’s global agenda with the Arctic strategic calculus, in light of recent dynamics, will determine whether the High North remains a fragile region where involved actors maintain cooperation or becomes another global theatre for long-term strategic competition between rival blocs.

Marko Filijović holds a PhD in Security Studies and is a Security and Geopolitical Advisor at Riley Risk Inc. and a Consultant at London Politica.

Samuel Jardine is the Head of Research at London Politica, a Senior Advisor at Luminint, and a Research Associate with the Climate Change and (In)Security Project (a collaboration by the University of Oxford and CHACR, British Army).